

Longitudinal genomic investigation of *Clostridioides difficile* transmission in a densely sampled ICU cohort

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
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
Genomic epidemiology to study healthcare-associated pathogens

- Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) has revolutionized our ability to track the spread of pathogens
- The unprecedented resolution of WGS enables insights into whether two patients harbor pathogens that are plausibly linked by transmission in the facility
- In healthcare settings, WGS is increasingly being used in the context of routine infection prevention




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
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
Some genomic epidemiology jargon

- Sequence type (ST) – a high-level classification of bacterial pathogens based on the sequence at ~7 genes
 - Used to track emerging threats at larger scales
 - Most transmission will be isolates of the same ST
- Single nucleotide variants (SNVs) – Number of positions across the genome where two bacterial isolates vary
 - *C. difficile* has 4 million base pair genome with ~4,000 genes
 - The number of SNVs consistent with transmission varies by bacteria, but is typically less than 20 SNVs



Clostridioides difficile is a genetically and epidemiologically diverse pathogen

- Common ancestor of disease-causing lineages of *C. difficile* date back almost 400K years ago
- Strains can vary by hundreds of thousands of single nucleotide variants, and half their gene content
- *C. difficile* is a mix of toxigenic and non-toxigenic strains, with infection being caused by the toxin producers



Strains of *C. difficile* differ in their epidemiology


- Diverse strains underlying burden *C. difficile* infections in the U.S.
- NAP1 (ribotype 027/ST1) and NAP4 (ribotype 014-020/ST2) were historically the dominant strains in the U.S.
- ST1/027 enriched in healthcare facilities, ST2/014 has presence in both hospitals and community

Table 4. Distribution of *C. difficile* Strains, According to Epidemiologic Category.*

Strain	Community-Associated CDI (N = 735)	Health Care-Associated CDI (N = 629)
	no. of cases (%)	
NAP1	138 (18.8)	193 (30.7)
NAP1-related†	13 (1.8)	20 (3.2)
NAP2	13 (1.8)	10 (1.6)
NAP3	3 (0.4)	12 (1.9)
NAP4	84 (11.4)	65 (10.3)
NAP5	3 (0.4)	6 (1.0)
NAP6	56 (7.6)	27 (4.3)
NAP7	25 (3.4)	13 (2.1)
NAP7-related‡	2 (0.3)	2 (0.3)
NAP8	5 (0.7)	1 (0.2)
NAP9	22 (3.0)	9 (1.4)
NAP10	21 (2.9)	15 (2.4)
NAP11	79 (10.7)	63 (10.0)
NAP12	9 (1.2)	16 (2.5)
Unnamed§	245 (33.3)	163 (25.9)
Could not be typed¶	17 (2.3)	14 (2.2)

Clostridioides difficile has a presence in both community and healthcare settings

- While often thought of a hospital pathogen, toxigenic *C. difficile* has diverse community reservoirs
- While improvements in infection prevention practices and antibiotic stewardship have decreased health-associated *C. difficile* infection (CDI), community-associated cases have remained flat



Guh et al. Trends in U.S. Burden of *Clostridioides difficile* Infection and Outcomes. New England Journal of Medicine, (2020).

How much of the burden of *C. difficile* infection in hospitals stems from healthcare transmission?

Prior work hints at an under-estimation of hospital-onset CDI stemming from admission colonization

- Seminal work showed that most isolates from CDI cases could not be genetically linked to prior case, indicating acquisition from unsampled reservoirs inside or outside the hospital¹
- Multiple studies support the risk of developing CDI in the hospital among those with asymptomatic carriage²
- However, it's unclear the degree to which asymptomatic carriage is acquired during or prior to hospital admission³


1. Eyre et al., Diverse Sources of *C. difficile* Infection Identified on Whole-Genome Sequencing, NEJM, 2013

2. Zacharioudakis et al., Colonization With Toxinogenic *C. difficile* Upon Hospital Admission, and Risk of Infection: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, AJG, 2015


3. Kong et al., *Clostridium difficile*: Investigating Transmission Patterns Between Infected and Colonized Patients Using Whole Genome Sequencing, CID, 2019

Studying transmission and infection using a densely sampled longitudinal cohort

→
Daily rectal surveillance for *C. difficile* carriage
for all ICU patients over 9-month study




Overview of *C. difficile* samples recovered and whole-genome sequenced



Strain dynamics in the ICU over time


Overview of 425 *C. difficile* genome sequences isolated from 209 admissions

- All sequence types (STs), except ST3 harbored exclusively toxigenic or non-toxicogenic strains
- 40 unique STs detected, with a total of 179 unique patient-ST combinations
- ST1 (ribotype 027) the 7th most prevalent ST, and only detected in 7 patients




Patients with multiple STs harbored a mix of toxigenic and non-toxigenic strains

- 13/86 (15%) admissions with multiple isolates had multiple STs detected
- Patients harbored tox/non-tox strains in different combinations (7 tox/tox, 5 tox/non-tox, 1 non-tox/non-tox)



Common strains of *C. difficile* were present in the unit throughout the study




Transmission dynamics in the ICU

In total, we detected 120 importation events and 51 culture acquisition events for *C. difficile*

	Screening prevalence	Importation prevalence	Culture acquisition prevalence	Incidence rate (acquisitions per 100 bed-days)
All <i>C. difficile</i>	209/1289 (16.3%)	120/1147 (10.5%)	51/563 (9%)	2.1
Toxigenic only	120/1289 (9.3%)	67/1147 (5.9%)	32/584 (5.5%)	1.6

Examining multi-strain colonization does not support protection from non-toxigenic strains

- 584 admissions qualified for acquisition analysis, of which 32 acquired toxigenic *C. difficile*
- 4 toxigenic acquisitions among 27 non-toxigenic importers (14.8%)
- 28 toxigenic acquisitions among 557 individuals with no *C. difficile* detected on admission (5.0%)
- Chi-squared $p < 0.001$




Genomic analysis of putative culture-based
within unit acquisitions


Identifying a single nucleotide variant (SNV) threshold for detection of transmission

- Two common approaches to select SNV threshold, intra-patient diversity and epidemiologic enrichment
 - Maximal intra-patient diversity is used to set the upper limit on the number of SNVs detected between direct transmission pairs
 - Epidemiologic enrichment seeks to identify a threshold that maximizes consistency with shared exposures presumed to mediate transmission
- Previous work in *C. difficile* has established a 2 SNV threshold using both approaches

More than 95% of isolate pairs of the same ST, from the same patient are 2 SNV or less




Overlapping ICU admissions are enriched among patients whose isolates are below 2 SNVs




A minority of culture acquisitions have genomic linkages to another study isolate within the MICU

- Only 7/32 acquisitions linked within 2 SNVs to another isolate
- One of these was deemed to have weak support based on small genetic distances to epidemiologically unlinked isolates from outside RUMC
- Thus, 6/32 (19%) of culture acquisitions have a putative within unit source




How do we account for the other culture acquisitions that lack genomic linkages within the MICU?




- Transmission from MICU patients not enrolled in study?
- Transmission/exposure from outside MICU?
- Persistent environmental reservoir in the MICU?
- Multiple strains carried, but only one detected?
- False negative surveillance on admission?

Support for false negative surveillance #1: sporadic detection of *C. difficile* over time



- Among admissions with three samples, two of which were culture positive, 27/76 (36%) had at least one intervening culture negative
- Restricting to toxigenic strains, 14/36 (39%) admissions met this criteria


Support for false negative surveillance #2: preferential detection of OTU matching *C. difficile* in admission negative samples for future acquirers



- Compared prevalence of *C. difficile* associated OTU in culture-negative admission samples from patients who did and didn't go on to culture positive for *C. difficile*
- *C. difficile*-associated OTU preferentially observed in admission samples from patients who subsequently culture positive ($p < 0.001$)

Does colonization influence the risk for infection?

Colonization on admission is associated with subsequent episode of hospital-onset CDI



- 11 HO-CDI cases in MICU cohort were identified based on EHR record of diarrhea and PCR for *tcdB* on day 4 of hospitalization or later
- 2 cases in patients whom we did not detect *C. difficile* on admission, but did not qualify for acquisition analysis
- 3 cases in patients with culture-based acquisition, but only 1 of which had genomic support of within unit acquisition
- 6 cases in patients who were colonized with *C. difficile* on admission (HR 24.4, 95% CI 6.89-86.5, $p < 0.001$)

Summary and conclusions

- We identified six genomically supported cases of within MICU transmission of *C. difficile* among asymptomatic carriers over 9 months, leading to one documented case of HO-CDI
 - => suggests current infection prevention practices in the MICU are limiting within unit cross-transmission among asymptomatic carriers, given reservoir of 120 carriers
- Consistent with prior studies, we observed an >20-fold increased risk of HO-CDI in patients asymptomatically colonized with *C. difficile* on admission
 - => supports the contribution of transition from colonization to infection to HO-CDI
- Together, these findings support the contribution of asymptomatic carriage to HO-CDI in the MICU being primarily mediated by carriers themselves developing CDI, versus onward transmission to others

Limitations

- Study limited to single MICU in single healthcare setting
- Cannot rule out hospital acquisition via other routes beyond within-unit patient-to-patient transmission among asymptomatic cases (e.g. outside unit, shared procedure rooms, HCWs, environmental contamination)
- Did not track longer term incidence of CDI among patients acquiring C. difficile in the unit
- Study results likely would not translate to times or places where epidemic healthcare associated lineages (e.g. ST1/027) are circulating at high prevalence

Implications of these results on infection prevention

- These results support the ability to prevent cross-transmission of *C. difficile* within a unit with effective measures
 - Single rooms, cleaning with sporicidal agents
- These results support the importance of understanding triggers of the transition from colonization to infection
 - Specific antibiotics, other medications
- These results support the value of whole-genome sequencing in understanding putative transmission among colonized and infected individuals in hospitals
 - Apparent transmission clusters can be conclusively ruled out

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