Broadcast live from the 2019 Infection Prevention and Control Canada Conference



Adapting IPAC in Unconventional Spaces


Peter Hoffman, Public Health England
Karenn Staniforth, Nottingham University Hospitals
Dr. Michael Weinbren, University Hospitals Coventry



Design for IPC in "unconventional" locations

Peter Hoffman HCAI & AMR Division Consultant Clinical Scientist Public Health England





Preamble – the presenter

Takes part in devising guidance – always aiming for the ideal situation Advises and investigates on outbreaks of infection – often far from ideal

The approach for this presentation – I will try to outline the ideal, but also give ideas of the relative value of measures.

➤ Often the more resource-intense measures are relatively low payback interventions and the more affordable measures yield good results.

I have no conflict of interests

One point of definition: I will be using "decontamination" to mean any process or sequence of processes that make a reusable medical device safe for reuse – cleaning, cleaning + disinfection, cleaning + sterilization, cleaning + disinfection + sterilization.



Preamble – The problem

Hospital design – Planning a facility that will serve its purpose for the next 30 - 50 years is impossible. No ideal approach – just looking for the least worst.

What will change?

The services and interventions, but also the microbial challenges.

The concept of a "hospital biome"?

- ➤ I am sceptical when it comes to the dry environment this is just transient contamination
- ➤ I believe it when focussed on the wet environment more from my co-presenters in this session



Design for IPC in "unconventional" locations

This presentation will focus on those areas of healthcare not normally covered in sufficient IPC detail in guidance.

First:

Operating room surgical instrument "preparation" areas – those areas where sterile instruments are unpacked and prepared for use: "layup".

In UK use: "preparation" or "prep" rooms.

Much detail on ORs, little on prep rooms





Airborne contamination in OR suites



1,000 litres of air in an empty room




Same - but now person walking by sampler





A critical purpose of OR suite ventilation is to keep exposed instruments clean



Probably the majority of airborne bacteria that end-up in a surgical wound, do so via exposed instruments.

Anywhere that sterile instruments are exposed should be ventilated to be at least as clean as the OR





OR suites – layup for conventional and laminar flow ventilation

- ➤ In conventional (i.e. non-laminar flow) ORs, either the preparation room is ventilated to the same standard as the OR, or layup occurs in the OR.
- For ultraclean ventilated ("laminar flow") ORs, layup should occur under the ultraclean airflow.
 - ➤ If that is not possible, consider horizontal laminar flow in the preparation room







Interventional imaging and minimally invasive surgery

These are surgical procedures that have "evolved" via a different route.

Many facilities not ventilated to any particular standard.

Just because there is no effective wound does not mean there is no exposure to airborne microbes via the instruments used, but generally use individually packed items opened immediately before use.

UK Healthcare Infection Society guidance that these should have ventilation that gives 15 air changes per hour



Minor surgical procedures

Poor definition but "those that are carried out under local anaesthesia and that are superficial. The operative site is usually limited in size by whether it can be anaesthetized locally." is a reasonable place to start – but exclude intraocular procedures.

Here airborne contamination with skin microbes is not a particular problem.

Can be naturally ventilated rooms (opening windows with fly screens), cleanable surfaces, dedicated sterile instrument store.



Guidance on facilities for minimally invasive and minor surgery is freely available on the Healthcare Infection Society website

Journal of Hospital Infection 80 (2012) 103-109

Guidelines

Guidelines on the facilities required for minor surgical procedures and minimal access interventions

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H. Humphreys a, b, *, J.E. Coia c, A. Stacey d, M. Thomas e, A.-M. Belli f, P. Hoffman g, P. Jenks h, C.A. Mackintosh i
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ORs in specialist burns units

In the UK, specialist burns units often have their own OR on the unit – debridement, skin grafts and dressings changes

With burns, the skin flora dispersed from the staff is of minimal risk to a burns patient

It is probable that there is significant aerosolisation of the bacteria infecting/colonising during surgical procedures/dressings changes

The main task in a burns OR would be to prevent these aerosols flushed-out into common wards area – as would happen with standard OR ventilation.

Consider burns ORs being designed with negative pressure ventilation

Will still get dilution of airborne contaminants for the safety of subsequent patients and dilution of anaesthetic gases, but no escape of aerosols into common ward areas

Currently the topic of a Healthcare Infection Society working group.



Acinetobacter — the trojan horse of infection control?

L. Teare a,*, N. Martin b,c,d, W. Elamin a, K. Pilgrim a, T. Tredoux b, J. Swanson e, P. Hoffman f

Journal of Hospital Infection 102 (2019) 45-53

Conclusion: In an outbreak where contact precautions and environmental cleaning are optimal, it is important to give careful consideration to other mechanisms of spread. If there is a failure to do this, it is likely that the true causes of transmission will not be addressed and the problem will recur. It is recommended that burn theatres within burn facilities should be designed to operate at negative pressure; this is the opposite of normal operating theatre ventilation. Where showers are used, both the shower head and the hose should be changed after a patient with a resistant organism. The role of non-contact disinfection (e.g. hydrogen peroxide dispersal) should be reconsidered, and constant vigilance should be given to any 'trojan horse' item in the room.





Isolation of infectious patients: "source isolation"

The vast majority of "isolation" is procedural (isolation of the microbes rather than the patient) – the facility has to enable and encourage good procedures.

- ➤ Lobbies for storage and disposal of PPE, and handwashing. Useful space but negotiable.
- Shower/toilet higher priority (except for immobile ITU patients)
 - > can't isolate a patient with highly resistant Enterobacteriaceae adequately if they have to use a communal toilet
 - commode decontamination can be poor QA
 - bedpans usually need to be transported to a different location for disposal with same gloves on staff hands (no 5 moments of glove hygiene)



Isolation of airborne infectious patients: "airborne isolation"

Need to ensure all gaps in a patient room's integrity do not leak out to adjacent occupied spaces

Negative pressure – more air extracted than supplied, deficit made up by air coming in through gaps

Also a high turnover of air to dilute infectious particles in the air

Comparatively easy to do if there is a mechanical ventilation system

In resource limited areas where this is not practical, local extract should be possible

- > Local ducted extract, or fan in wall or window.
- Only staff should have control of that fan
- > No opening windows



Protective isolation

Most protection of patients is procedural

A small number of highly neutropenic patients need protection against inhalation of fungal spores – one of the few occasions when patients need protection against the environment outside the hospital

Air to their rooms supplied via HEPA filter; more air supplied than extracted ("positive pressure") so gaps leak outwards preventing ingress of unfiltered air

- ➤ Positive pressure without HEPA filtration is pointless
- ➤ The air change rate is irrelevant the ventilation is to exclude not dilute

As these are usually cohortable patients, e.g. bone marrow transplant, can put HEPA filters in the air handling unit so the whole ward can be free of fungal spores

Air passes from patient room, out into common ward spaces and then out into the rest of the hospital



Endoscopy procedure rooms

Much guidance says that these should be at positive pressure to protect the patient

Not sure how this protects patients and against what?

For lower GI endoscopy, no airborne risk to patients and negative pressure would contain smells

For those bronchoscopies where there may be a TB risk, negative pressure in both the procedure and the recovery area would contain infectious aerosols.



Endoscope decontamination areas

Need to have a clear sequential flow from dirty to clean, with no cross over – to prevent recontamination.

These do not need special ventilation to control microbial contamination (but may do if toxic vapours from the disinfectant)

Ideally 2 rooms, with pass-through endoscope washer-disinfectors

Still possible to use 1 room dedicated to decontamination, but staff behaviour becomes much more critical.

Decontamination is far more difficult to do in the procedure room – not recommended




Intracavity ultrasound devices – transvaginal, transrectal and trans(o)esophageal (TOE/TEE) probe decontamination

These are less complex than endoscopes (no lumens), but still present difficulties Currently their decontamination is usually at the point of use and poorly controlled



TOE/TEE probe



Probe insertion tube immersible but not angulation wheels or plug body, unlike endoscopes where they are totally immersible.





My first encounter with TOE/TEE probes









Then



Morriston Hospital hepatitis B death: Lessons learned, says ABM health board

A cardiac patient who died after contracting hepatitis B at a Swansea hospital did not receive a high standard of care, say health chiefs.



An independent external review panel was asked to investigate the circumstances surrounding the hepatitis B infection.

The panel has made several recommendations about decontamination, infection prevention and control, staff training and auditing procedures.

It found that the most likely cause of the infection was a contaminated probe.





2 subsequent publications

Guidelines for transoesophageal echocardiographic probe cleaning and disinfection from the British Society of Echocardiography^{†,‡}

P. Kanagala¹, C. Bradley², P. Hoffman³, and R.P. Steeds^{4*}

Guidance for the decontamination of intracavity medical devices: the report of a working group of the Healthcare Infection Society

C.R. Bradley ^a, P.N. Hoffman ^{b,*}, K. Egan ^c, S.K. Jacobson ^d, A. Colville ^e, W. Spencer ^f, S. Larkin ^g, P.J. Jenks ^h

European Journal of Echocardiography (2011) 12; i17 – i23

Journal of Hospital Infection 101 (2019) 1—10



Intracavity probe decontamination – the future

Covers/sheathes can not be relied on to protect the probe. Areas not covered will make contact with user's contaminated hands

Decontamination of the probe (typically transvaginal and transrectal) when still connected to its associated equipment is likely to be poor QA

There need to be adequate facilities for probe decontamination, either at the location of use or elsewhere.

As with endoscopes, there needs to be a defined dirty to clean flow. Preferably good facilities to clean, then controlled disinfection

Some automated systems do not disinfect the whole probe including parts that do not make patient contact; still need a manual element for these.

Redesigning the probes so that they are fully immersible would be a major step forward









Neonatal intensive care units

Incubator decontamination

To dismantle, clean and disinfect an incubator and associated components (mattress, leads, stethoscope etc.) in a clear dirty to clean flow requires a lot of work space.

In a typical UK NICU, there are occasions when several incubators will need to decontaminated in a short time

The facility in which this is done is almost always too small and has insufficient space for optimal decontamination

This is not high technology and does not differ much between health economies

This requirement should be considered as a fundamental design parameter





Dirty utility ("sluice") rooms

Used for disposal of body fluids, disposal or decontamination of bedpans and urinals, decontamination and storage of commodes, usually other storage as well, some point-of-use tests (e.g. urine dipsticks) and temporary storage of waste

Problem 1 – These are rarely large enough. Disassembly and decontamination of commode, plus their storage, requires space

Problem 2 – Contaminated gloved HCW hand opening sluice room door – common contact point. Solution unclear – non-touch door opening? Sluice room with no door?

In an era of multi-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, these rooms have become far more important.









The Healthcare Infection Society as a resource

https://www.his.org.uk/

Has freely available resources -


- > HIS guidelines
- > other UK resources
- ➤ "IPC in 5" 5 minute digested presentations from the HIS trainee program





Risks and Competing Priorities in Water Management

Karren Staniforth, Clinical Scientist Nottingham University Hospitals, UK





Overview, Aims and Conflicts of Interest

The presenter: a Clinical Scientist working within the Infection Prevention and Control Team of a large teaching hospital in the UK

The Approach and aim of this presentation is to demonstrate, through various examples, evidence that:

- Potentially infectious organisms are present wherever there is water (unless this is sterile, which in most cases it is not)
- Eradication of these risks may not be possible or may depend on actions which produce undesirable consequences
- Decisions around water management may not be easy or clear-cut; forcing us to balance conflicting risks
- Whilst general principles are discussed every situation will be different

The presenter has no conflicts of interest to declare





Nottingham University Hospitals



Queen's Medical Centre



Nottingham City Campus





Nottingham University Hospitals

https://www.nuh.nhs.uk says

- Serves 2.5 million residents
- ~15,000 staff
- ~ 90 Wards
- ~ 1,700 beds
- ~ 50 Operating Theatres
- 3 sites, City Campus, QMC Campus, Rope Walk
- Annual income of £824million (NHS Choices 2017)

- Plus 3-4 million for regional specialist units:

 Stoke, Renal, Neurology, Cancer Services, Major Trauma, Burns and Plastics, Orthopaedics, Cardiac Surgery, Haematology and BMT, Obstetrics and two neonatal units

 QMC incorporates the Nottingham Children's Hospital



Jimma University Hospital, Ethiopia

NUH has had a partnership with The Jimma University Hospital, since 1993 and many staff have visited to share ideas

This is Christine (NUH Infection Prevention & Control Nurse) learning about water management at the Jimma University Hospital










"Safe to Drink" - Not Sterile!







Prolonged Outbreak of Mycobacterium chimaera Infection After Open-Chest Heart Surgery

Hugo Sax,^{1,e} Guido Bloemberg,^{2,e} Barbara Hasse,^{1,e} Rami Sommerstein,¹ Philipp Kohler,¹ Yvonne Achermann,¹ Matthias Rössle,³ Volkmar Falk,⁴ Stefan P. Kuster,¹ Erik C. Böttger,^{2,e} and Rainer Weber^{1,e}


¹Division of Infectious Diseases and Hospital Epidemiology, University Hospital Zurich, ²Institute of Medical Microbiology, National Centre for Mycobacteria, University of Zurich, ³Institute of Surgical Pathology, and ⁴Division of Cardiac Surgery, University Hospital Zurich, Switzerland

Background. Invasive Mycobacterium chimaera infections were diagnosed in 2012 in 2 heart surgery patients on georeal circulation. We launched an outbreak investigation to identify the source and extent of the potential to implement preventive measures.

Mycobacteria (2012)



Published to September Published Health England











1° C Temperature reduction decreases oxygen consumption by 10 %




























Biofilm is a risk in all water based heating and cooling systems



But failure to modulate temperature during surgery is also a risk...











9 October 2012 Last updated at 20:41

Share If V

Baby dies in Southmead Hospital pseudomonas outbreak

A premature baby died and 12 others were given treatment after an outbreak of a water-borne bacterium at a Bristol neonatal unit, it has been confirmed.

Southmead Hospital said it had found traces of pseudomonas aeruginosa in the water system for its neonatal intensive care unit.

The hospital said the baby died in August after contracting the bacterium.




Filters have been fitted to the unit's water system


Four babies died after contracting the bug in hospitals in Northern Ireland in December and January.


It was also found at the Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital in March.




















Is it just "Older hospitals?"

Garvey et al., J Hosp Infect 2018





QMC opened in 1977

QEHB opened in 1977

Both had water

occupation

Occupation








The "Hand-Wash Only" WHB

But it is not just about engineeringout the problem-

Pseudomonas aeruginosa POSITIVE






























Burns Hydrotherapy

"Our burns patients are contaminated with dirty admitted"











Healthcare Infection Society What about the waste pipes?













Garvey MI et al., J Hosp Infect 2017; De Geyter et al., Antimicrobial Resist Infect Control 2017





Are there places where sinks add more risk?









Shower Drains

esults			
) Enterobacter clo	acae		
	1)		
Amikacin	(R)		
Amoxicillin	R		
Co-amoxiclav	R		
Ceftazidime	(R)		
Cefuroxime	R		
Ceftriaxone	(R)		
Ciprofloxacin	R		
Ertapenem	(R)		
Gentamicin	R		
Meropenem	(R)		
Piptazobactam	R		
Trimethoprim	(R)		
ew Delhi Metallo-b	eta-lactam	ase (ND	M) enzyme



Legionella 1976 Mycobacteria 2012 Pseudomonas 2012 CRE / CPE 2016



IMPORTANT

Please let a member of staff know if your shower is not draining





Does increased flow reduce the risks?







Even the kitchen sink





Floor Cleaning Equipment














JULY-SEPT. 2016 ARE THE 3 HIGHEST MONTHS IN 7 YEARS (DE-DUPLICATED BC +VE FOR ASB)





Balancing our risks



Life saving surgery with an increased risk of infection (and patient consent)


Patient safety or pain relief (baths and bubble tubes)

Automated cleaning versus labour intensive mopping

Clean sheets or clean looking sheets and heating etc.









Basic Principles

- People need clean safe water, bacteria are less exacting and will contaminate anything which contains water
- Water which is safe to drink is not usually sterile
- Keep things simple
- Keep things clean
- Consider hygienic design and maintenance requirements
- Do not buy, borrow, accept or install anything which you can't keep clean and in good working order
- Know your most vulnerable patients?







Summary

- However rapidly we adapt our environment the microbes will easily keep up
- Antimicrobial resistance makes water management (and cleaning) more important then ever but...

-Resistant organisms could be the key


Highlighting routes of transmission

which historically went unnoticed

If the water is not safe then stick to alcohol:
Can we design-out our non-essential water risks...









Acknowledgements

- Healthcare Infection Society
- Team NUH, Nottingham University Hospitals, UK
 - John Campbell, Chief Percussionist
 - Natalie Vaughan & The Infection Prevention & Control Team
 - Estate & Facilities Staff

• Mark Garvey – Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham, UK





Thank you






The hand wash station friend or fiend??


Dr. Michael Weinbren, University Hospitals Coventry



















John Snow



























Joachim Kohn 1912-1987





546 2 Describer 1967

Correspondence

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Procedures Inflormed in Hospital

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All, To end with your labour the ration of the S. S. There and other 31. Threaden, p. 111), repeting an authority of Franciscourse on, exceptioning in a

This brings me to the role of the drainage and plumbing system—that is, sinks, washbasins, and traps. Your leading article is perhaps too cautious in saying that the evidence of infection from sinks and drains, etc., is not clearly established. In fact traps and wash-basins undoubtedly are a reservoir and can and do become a source of crossinfection. On a number of occasions patients' raw areas were colonized or infected by strains isolated from the traps of the washbasins previous to the patient's admission.

I am, etc., Queen Mary's Hospital

Rochampton, London S.W.15. J. Kohn.





Professor Kevin Kerr








Journal of Hospital Infection (2009) 73, 338-344







www.elsevierhealth.com/journals/jhir

REVIEW

Pseudomonas aeruginosa: a formidable and ever-present adversary

K.G. Kerr *.*, A.M. Snelling b

- * Department of Microbiology, Harrogate District Hospital, Harrogate, North Yorkshire, UK
- ^b Division of Biomedical Sciences & Bradford Infection Group, University of Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire, UK

Available online 21 August 2009

Healthcare associated infection; Hospital environment; Infection control; Pseudomones onruginosa

Summary Pseudomonos ceruginoso is a versatile pathogen associated with a broad spectrum of infections in humans. In healthcare settings the bacterium is an important cause of infection in vulnerable individuals. including those with burns or neutropenia or receiving intensive care. In these groups morbidity and mortality attributable to P. geruginosa infection can be high. Management of infections is difficult as P. peruginoso is inherently resistant to many antimicrobials. Furthermore, treatment is being rendered increasingly problematic due to the emergence and spread of resistance to the few agents that remain as therapeutic options. A notable recent development is the acquisition of carbapenemases by some strains of P. geruginosa. Given these challenges, it would seem reasonable to identify strategies that would prevent acquisition of the bacterium by hospitalised patients. Environmental reservoirs of P. peruginoso are readily identifiable, and there are numerous reports of outbreaks that have been attributed to an environmental source; however, the role of such sources in sporadic pseudomonal infection is less well understood. Nevertheless there is emerging evidence from prospective studies to suggest that environmental sources, especially water, may have significance in the epidemiology of sporadic P. peruginosa infections in hospital settings, including intensive care units. A better understanding of the role of environmental reservoirs in pseudomonal infection will permit the development of new strategies. and refinement of existing approaches to interrupt transmission from these sources to patients.

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8195-4701 (5 - see front matter © 2009 The Hospital Infection Society. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1014/j.jhin.2009.04.000






^{*} Corresponding author. Address: Department of Microbiology, Harvogate District Mospital, Lancaster Park Road, Harvogate, North-Torkshee HG2 75X, UK. Tel.: +44 1423 533077.
\$\frac{\pi}{\pi}\$ most address: \$\frac{\pi}{\pi}\$ hours.


















LARGE WATER PIPES IN BUILDING


PERIPHERY OF SYSTEM







Drinking water - how the treatment plant works



Legionella

WATER SUPPLY AND WASTE SYSTEM

Wide range of organisms
Size of problem?


www.his.org.uk


OHIS_Infection





HOSPITAL












Health Technical Memorandum 04-01: Safe water in healthcare premises

Controls less easily monitored

Part time involvement

No proper training

The clinical interface not the province of most water management companies : *Pseudomonas* inosa – advice for ented care units





L8 (Fourth edition) Published 2013



WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION

Thousands of people die every day around the world from infections acquired while receiving health care

Hands are the main pathways of germ transmission during health care

Hand hygiene is therefore the most important measure to avoid the transmission of harmful germs and prevent health care-associated infections





Preferred method of hand decontamination

Do not use if hands visibly soiled, or resistant organisms




HAND WASH STATION



USE if hands visibly soiled, or resistant organisms






SOLE PURPOSE - DECONTAMINATION OF HANDS













NON-CLINICAL **AREAS**


LB G S


GLINICAL AREAS

Health Building Note 00-1 Part C: Sanitary assemblie

2.37 Basin taps used in clinical areas and foodpreparation and laboratory areas are required to be operated without the use of hands.


















www.his.org.uk

② SHIS_Infection



CLINICAL AREAS LICOMMUNALAREAS

NON-CLINICAL
AREAS FACILITIES
NON-NOTISHARED
AREAS

2.37 Basin taps used in clinical areas and foodpreparation and laboratory areas are required to be operated without the use of hands.





Sensor or elbow operated?





TMVs placed everywhere.

One sided risk assessment.











98% staff used hands to turn on outlets





68% staff used hands to turn off outlets









ANGLE OF SETUP OF ELBOW LEVER




44% FLUSH OR
END OF LEVER
WITHIN 3 CMS OF
BACK PANEL


















Outbreak of multi-drug resistant *Pseudomonas* aeruginosa























































































































Characterisations of hand washing sink artiffication a single hospital medical Society intensive care unit. Marika Grabowski., Jennifer M. Lobo, Brian Gunnell, Kyle Enfield, Rick

Carpenter, Laura Barnes. Amy Mathers, Journal of Hospital Infection in Press

- Of the 2,973 videos with analysed behaviours there were 5,614 observed behaviours which were assessed as; 37.4% medical care, 29.2% additional behaviours, 17.0% hand hygiene, 7.2% patient nutrition, 5.0% environmental care, 4.2% non-medical care.
- Hand washing was only 4% (224/5,614) of total behaviours.

Subanalysis of 2,748 of the later videos further categorised 56 activities where a variety of nutrients, which could promote microbial growth,

Table 1: Action counts and percentages for behaviours occurring at patient room sinks						
Group	Action name	Action count	Count /room/day	Percent group	Percent total	
	Fill syringe or med cup*†	590	9.83	32.92	13.24	
	Empty syringe or med cup†	337	5.62	18.81	7.56	
	Drain IV bag†	112	1.87	6.25	2.51	
	Medical item cleaned	53	0.88	2.96	1.19	
	Medical item placed	297	4.95	16.57	6.66	
Medical	Medical item removed	331	5.52	18.47	7.43	
	Madical probabing placed	2.4	0.40	1.74	0.54	

	Paper towel	444	7.40	53.30	9.96
	Hand wash	195	3.25	23.41	4.38
	Total	833	13.88	100	18.69
	EVS staff wiped sink	40	0.67	23.39	0.90
	Non-EVS wiped sink	24	0.40	14.04	0.54
Environmental	Cleaning supplies placed	43	0.72	25.15	0.96
care	Cleaning supplies removed	48	0.80	28.07	1.08
			/	3	


CONCLUSION

Several non hygiene activities commonly took place in ICU handwashing sinks which may provide a mechanism for nosocomial transmission and promotion of bacterial growth in the drain. Redesigning hospital workflow and sink usage may be necessary as sink drains as a reservoir for transmission of multidrug resistant bacteria are increasingly realised.

	Water glass filled* Water glass emptied?	37 102	0.62 1.70	10.85 29.91	0.83
nutrition	Tube feed bag emptied	4	0.07	1.17	0.09
Patient	Tube feed bag filled	23	0.38	6.74	0.52
	Non-water beverage emptied	46	0.77	13.49	1.03
	Food/beverage removed	61	1.02	17.89	1.37
	Poor beverage placed	00	1.12	19.9+	1.23

Total	1113	18.55	100	24.57
Overnil total	4457	74.28		100






































CASE ASCERTAINMENT









Pseudomonas aeruginosa NEONATES

ADULTS- endogenous carriage

Unusual organisms
Stenotrophomonas
Elizabethakingia
Cupriavidus
Atypical mycobacteria






We may be 'sensitive' but we cause the most damage to humans

Two or more antibiotic resistant isolates may prompt an incident outbreak meeting

Sensitive strains Invisible 'Stealth bacteria'





THE LANCET, SEPT

A WASTE-TRAP-STER

J. Kohn


Queen Mary's Hospital, Roeh

BACTERIOLOGICAL examination effluent side of a hospital pla reveals the presence of pathoge waste-traps in particular act bacteriological flora, predomine group of pathogens, the most c æruginosa. The mechanism of way from the trap of the basin to ing under running water is easi This mode of transmission has


mentally and under ward conditions using a marker organism. Estimates of the frequency with which patients become infected from washbasins vary, and the risk may vary from place to place. There can be little doubt that a contaminated plumbing system plays a role in the spread of infection, especially where a susceptible patient population is at risk. This applies particularly to premature-baby units, burns units, or where immunosuppressive and cytotoxic drugs are used. In this situation the elimination of www.his.or every possible source of infection is justified, even when the HIS_Infer risk is relatively small. All attempts to eliminate bacterial

















Death's Dispensary 2019

OPEN TO THE VERY SICK, FREE, BY PERMISSION of HUMAN INDIFFERENCE



















Hopman et al. Antimicrobial Resistance and Infection Control (2017) 6:59
DOI 10.1186/s13756-017-0213-0

Antimicrobial Resistance and Infection Control

RESEARCH

ARCH Open Access

Reduced rate of intensive care unit acquired gram-negative bacilli after



Segmented regression analysis showed that the intervention was followed by a statistically significant Immediate reduction in Gram negative bacillus colonization

'water-free' patient care

Joost Hopman^{1*†}, Alma Tostmann^{1†}, Heiman Wertheim¹, Maria Bos¹, Eva Kolwijck¹, Reinier Akkermans³, Patrick Sturm^{1,4}, Andreas Voss^{1,2}, Peter Pickkers⁵ and Hans vd Hoeven⁵






























Unused Kalashnikov Vs old hand wash station





Do you need a license to own?

Do you require intense training to use?

Does operator perceive a risk?


Does victim / patient see as a risk?

Has use of this harmed anyone?

Has use of this killed anyone?

If it harms / kills anyone is it likely to be recognised?






Should we be developing experts in certain areas of infection control who have a regional remit?

'We spend a great deal of time studying history, which, let's face, is mostly the history of stupidity'

S. Hawking







DETECTED WITHIN 7 DAYS OF INOCULATING FIRST SINK TRAP



Thanks to Teleclass Education PATRON SPONSORS





